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受制于认知心理学的桎梏，人们无法解释为何历史类比在广受批评的同时依然屡见不鲜。借助本体安全研究的视角，本文从确保自传式叙事和自我—他者关系连贯性的角度出发对历史类比如何为国家建构稳定的集体身份进行阐释。为了更好地突出本体安全研究与研究历史类比的传统认知心理学路径之间的区别，本文以特朗普第一任总统任期和拜登执政时期美国所面临的本体安全威胁以及为此采取的“新冷战”叙事作为案例。这一时期的美国因民主运转不良、领导地位衰落以及自由国际秩序深陷危机而陷入焦虑和本体安全受损的状态之中。为此，美国通过将当前的中美关系与冷战时期的美苏关系进行类比，试图重振国内外对于民主的信心、建构极化的敌人形象和志同道合的朋友关系来恢复美国的国际领导地位以及在讲述冷战故事的过程中重新找回西方世界内部的共同价值认同以及美国国内的政治团结。
Abstract：For a long time, cognitive psychology approaches have dominated the understanding of historical analogy, making it difficult to explain why such analogy remain prevalent despite widespread criticism. This paper, through the perspective of ontological security studies, interprets the role of historical analogy in constructing a stable collective self-image of states by focusing on ensuring the coherence of autobiographical narratives and self-other relations. To better highlight the distinctions between ontological security studies and traditional research approaches to historical analogy, this paper takes the ontological security threats faced by the United States during the first term of Trump ' s presidency and Biden administration and the adoption of the "New Cold War" narrative as a case study. During this period, the United States had plunged into a state of anxiety and ontological insecurity due to democratic dysfunction, decline ofinternational leadership, and the crisis of the liberal international order. In response, the United States had attempted to restore its international leadership and political unity at home by drawing analogy between the current China-U.S. relation and the U.S.-Soviet relation during the Cold War. Through this narrative, the U.S. sought to reinvigorate domestic and international confidence in democracy, construct a polarized image of enemies and like-minded allies, and reclaim a shared sense of values within the Western world and political solidarity domestically by retelling the story of the Cold War.
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(1)近年来，讨论中美关系究竟与冷战期间的美苏关系是否相似的国内外研究已经汗牛充栋，代表性的成果可见杨勇萍、潘迎春：《美国对华“新冷战”的演进逻辑》，载《国际观察》2021年第2期；黄忠：《“冷战”视角下的中美“新冷战”》，载《国际论坛》2022年第1期；宋国友：《结构起点、政策选择与中美关系的另一种可能》，载《国际观察》2024年第1期；Khong Yuen Foong，“The US,China,and the Cold War Analogy”,China International Strategy Review,Vol.1,No.2,2019;Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis，“The New Cold War:America,China,and the Echoes of History”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.100,No.6,2021;Zhang Jue and Xu Jin，“China-US Strategic Competition and the Descent of a Porous Curtain”,Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.14,No.3,2021;Ali Wyne,America’s Great-Power Opportunity:Revitalizing US Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition (Polity Press,2022）。总体来看，既有讨论的重点在于通过剖析“冷战”这一概念的实质，以便仔细分辨中美关系与美苏关系的异同点；相比之下，本文则聚焦于从本体安全研究的视角出发诠释美国方面使用这种冷战类比的动因和意义。因此本文以提出并尝试回答“为什么”问题区别于既有讨论“相似与否”的“是什么”问题，而这也是被当前有关“新冷战”研究所忽视的一个重要维度。
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(1)《习近平在联合国成立75周年系列高级别会议上的讲话》，人民出版社2020年版，第4页。
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基本信息:
DOI：
中图分类号:D822.371.2
引用信息:
[1]周灏堃.历史类比的本体安全逻辑：以美国对中美关系进行冷战类比为例[J].战略决策研究,2025,16(03):39-61+140-141.
基金信息:
2020年国家社会科学基金重大项目“百年变局下的全球治理与‘一带一路’关系研究”（20&ZD147）的阶段性成果